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Abstract
Recent research has made the surprising finding that
state-of-the-art deep learning models sometimes fail to gen-
eralize to small variations of the input. Adversarial training
has been shown to be an effective approach to overcome this
problem. However, its application has been limited to enforc-
ing invariance to analytically defined transformations like
`p-norm bounded perturbations. Such perturbations do not
necessarily cover plausible real-world variations that pre-
serve the semantics of the input (such as a change in lighting
conditions). In this paper, we propose a novel approach to
express and formalize robustness to these kinds of real-world
transformations of the input. The two key ideas underlying
our formulation are (1) leveraging disentangled representa-
tions of the input to define different factors of variations, and
(2) generating new input images by adversarially composing
the representations of different images. We use a StyleGAN
model to demonstrate the efficacy of this framework. Specif-
ically, we leverage the disentangled latent representations
computed by a StyleGAN model to generate perturbations
of an image that are similar to real-world variations (like
adding make-up, or changing the skin-tone of a person) and
train models to be invariant to these perturbations. Extensive
experiments show that our method improves generalization
and reduces the effect of spurious correlations.
1. Introduction
The principle by which neural networks are trained to
minimize their average error on the training data is known
as Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM) [1]. ERM has, for
the most part, enabled breakthroughs in a wide variety of
fields [2–4], and this success has lead to the usage of neural
Figure 1. Two variations of the same face that are classified as both
“smiling” and “not smiling” with close to 100% confidence by the
same classifier. Note that this person “does not exist” and has been
generated using a StyleGAN model.
networks in applications that are safety-critical [5]. ERM,
however, is only guaranteed to produce meaningful models
when the data encountered during training and deployment
is drawn independently from the same distribution. When
a mismatch between training and testing data occurs, mod-
els can fail in catastrophic ways; and, unfortunately, such
occurrence is commonplace: training data is often collected
through a biased process that highlights confounding factors
and spurious correlations [6, 7], which can lead to undesir-
able consequences.1
The effects of such data shifts are largely detailed in the
literature. For example, both Recht et al. [8] and Hendrycks
et al. [9] show that the accuracy of IMAGENET models is
severely impacted by changes in the data collection process.
Methods to counteract such effect, which mainly consist
of data augmentation techniques, also struggle. Training
against corrupted data only forces the memorization of such
corruptions and, as a result, these models fail to generalize
to new corruptions [10, 11]. Works such as mixup [12] or
AutoAugment [13] pave the way to further improvements,
but still require significant domain knowledge to succeed in
1http://gendershades.org/
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practice.
Another parallel and important line of work uncovered
that the addition of small but carefully chosen deviations
to the input, called adversarial perturbations, can cause the
neural network to make incorrect predictions with high confi-
dence [14–18]. Techniques to build models that are robust to
adversarially perturbed examples, such as adversarial train-
ing [19], have received a significant amount of attention in
the recent years [16, 20–22]. The existence of imperceptible
perturbations that alter a model’s output demonstrates that
supervised learning algorithms still fail to capture the true
causal relationships between signal and label. The degrada-
tion of performance occurred when shifting between training
and adversarial (or otherwise corrupted) distributions indi-
cates that neural networks pick up on correlations that are not
necessarily robust to small input perturbations [23]. The ex-
istence of imperceptible adversarial perturbations highlights
just one form of spurious correlation that causes undesirable
behaviors in the networks we train.
This paper focuses on training models that are robust to
plausible real-world perturbations that preserve semantic
content (such as those presented in Figure 1). We go beyond
conventional data augmentation and adversarial training on
lp-norm bounded perturbations by leveraging high-quality
generative models that can describe such perturbations. In
particular, we address the question: “Given a generative
model with a sufficiently good disentangled representation
that aligns well with the perturbations of interest, can we
train neural networks that are resistant to bias and spurious
correlations present in the training data?” More specifically,
we consider StyleGAN [24] as our underlying generative
model. Our contributions are as follows:
1. We develop a framework dubbed Adversarial Mixing
with Disentangled Representations (AdvMix) which
leverages the disentangled latents of a generative model
to train networks that are robust to real-world variations.
2. We demonstrate how to leverage StyleGAN’s mixing
property to systematically transfer image attributes
likely to be misclassified across image instances, thus
allowing us to generate realistic worst-case semantic
variations. This enables us to define semantic pertur-
bations in a purely data-driven fashion, as opposed to
methods that require data collection under different
conditions [25].
3. We conduct extensive experiments on a controlled
Colored-MNIST dataset that compare Adversarial Mix-
ing with Disentangled Representations with random
data augmentation and demonstrate under which con-
ditions AdvMix achieves higher accuracy.
4. Finally, we demonstrate empirically on CELEBA that
accuracy is not necessarily at odds with robustness [26],
Figure 2. Comparison of different data augmentation techniques.
These transformations tend to destroy the image semantics.
once we consider semantic variations other than `p-
norm bounded variations.
2. Related work
Robustness to `p-norm perturbations. Generating pixel-
level adversarial perturbations has been and remains exten-
sively studied [16, 18–20, 27, 28]. Most works focus the
robustness of classifiers under `p-norm bounded perturba-
tions. In particular, it is expected that a robust classifier be
invariant to small perturbations in the pixel space (as de-
fined by the `p-norm). Goodfellow et al. [16] and Madry
et al. [19] laid down foundational principles to train robust
networks, and recent works [29, 30] continue to find novel
approaches to enhance robustness. While existing work is
able to train models that are robust to imperceptible pixel-
level variations, the study of robustness against semantically
meaningful perturbations is largely under-explored.
Adversarial robustness beyond `p-norm. Engstrom et al.
[31] and Kanbak et al. [32] explored geometric transforma-
tions such as rotations and translation of images. Early works
(e.g., Baluja and Fischer [33]) also demonstrated that it is
possible to go beyond analytically defined variations by us-
ing generative models to create perturbations. Song et al.
[34] and Xiao et al. [35] used a pre-trained AC-GAN [36] to
generate perturbations; and they demonstrated that it is possi-
ble to generate semantically relevant perturbations for tasks
such as MNIST, SVHN and CELEBA. Lastly, Qiu et al. [37]
have attempted to generate adversarial examples by inter-
polating through the attribute space defined by a generative
model. So far, there has been little to no work demonstrat-
ing robustness to such semantically plausible variations. As
such the effect of training models robust to such variations is
unclear. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first
to analyze the difference between adversarial training and
data augmentation in the space of semantically meaningful
variations.
Data augmentation Data augmentation can reduce gen-
eralization error. For image classification tasks, random
flips, rotations and crops are commonly used [38]. More so-
phisticated techniques such as Cutout [39] (which produces
random occlusions), CutMix [40] (which replaces parts of
an image with another) and mixup [12] (which linearly in-
terpolates between two images) all demonstrate extremely
compelling and surprising results. Indeed, while these meth-
ods often result in images that are visibly corrupted and void
of semantic meaning (even to the human eye), the resulting
models often achieve state-of-the-art accuracy across a wide
range of datasets. Figure 2 shows a comparison of these
different techniques.
Causal reasoning using additional data. Heinze-Deml
and Meinshausen [41] use grouped observations (e.g., the
same object under different conditions) to discover variations
that should not explain the classification label. More recently
Arjovsky et al. [25] developed a method called Invariant
Risk Minimization (IRM) which tries to find an invariant
predictor across different environments (or groups of data
points). Both methods were able to build classifiers that were
less sensitive to spurious correlations, which, in turn, lead
to classifiers that were less biased than classifiers trained
purely on an original biased training set. However, they
require explicitly annotated data collected under different
environmental conditions.
3. Adversarial Mixing with Disentangled Rep-
resentations
In this paper, we consider a model fθ parametrized by θ.
We would like our model to be robust or invariant to a set of
transformations T . Formally, our goal is to find the model
parameters θ that minimize the semantic adversarial risk
E
(x,y)∼D
[
max
t∈T
L(fθ(t(x)), y)
]
, (1)
where D ⊂ X × Y is a data distribution over pairs of ex-
amples x and corresponding labels y, and L is a suitable
loss function (such as the 0 − 1 loss in the context of clas-
sification tasks). The set of semantic transformations T
contains functions of the form t : X → X . Each element
t ∈ T is irreducible and, crucially, for the optimal classifier
fθ : X → Y , we would like that fθ(t(x)) = fθ(x) for all
t ∈ T . For example, an MNIST classifier should not be
affected by changes in the digit color. In the following, we
define a set of transformations T via a decoder that lever-
ages a disentangled latent representation and explain how to
evaluate the resulting risk in Equation (1).
Invariant latent factors. Disentanglement is perceived as
a desirable property of representations. Often, one hopes
to obtain a representation of the observed data x ∈ X in
terms of separate and conditionally independent factors z ∈
Z given x under a certain class of input transformations
[42]. In our particular setting, we will assume a task-specific
disentangled representation. Formally, we assume that we
have an ideal generator (or decoder), dec : Z → X , where
the latent space Z is a product space of the form Z =
Z‖×Z⊥. For a given classification task that predicts the label
y, only the coordinates corresponding to Z‖ are relevant,
while Z⊥ is irrelevant.
We formalize the above notions using conditional in-
dependence: given an example x = dec(z‖, z⊥) with
z⊥ ∈ Z⊥, z‖ ∈ Z‖ and corresponding label y ∈ Y , we
have
P(y|z‖, z⊥) = P(y|z‖). (2)
Hence, the ideal invariant classifier f? that outputs a prob-
ability distribution over Y should be consistent with the
invariance assumption:
f?(dec(z‖, z⊥)) = f?(dec(z‖, z˜⊥)) (3)
for all z˜⊥ ∈ Z⊥, and should output the correct label:
argmax
y′∈Y
f?(dec(z‖, z⊥)) = y. (4)
Finally, referring back to Equation (1) and assuming that
an ideal disentangled representation z‖ can be computed
as z‖(x), we define the set of transforms T that induce the
semantically irrelevant perturbations as:
T = {t|t(x) = dec(z‖(x), z˜⊥) with z˜⊥ ∈ Z⊥}. (5)
Adversarial training. Given a model fθ with enough ca-
pacity, minimizing the semantic adversarial risk in Equa-
tion (1) results in parameters θ?
θ? = argmin
θ
E
(x,y)∼D
x=dec(z‖,z⊥)
[
max
z˜⊥∈Z⊥
L(fθ(dec(z‖, z˜⊥)), y)
]
(6)
that satisfy Equations (3) and (4). In other words, there exists
no transformation t ∈ T that when applied to x would result
in a misclassification of the optimal classifier f? = fθ? .
Solving the saddle point problem in Equation (6) requires
solving the corresponding inner-maximization problem
z˜?⊥ = argmax
z˜⊥∈Z⊥
L(fθ(dec(z‖, z˜⊥)), y). (7)
As enumerating all possible latents z˜⊥ ∈ Z⊥ is often in-
tractable, we resort to a technique popularized by Madry
et al. [19] in the context of adversarial training, which con-
sists of using projected gradient ascent on a differentiable
surrogate loss. For a classification task, the 0 − 1 loss is
replaced with the cross-entropy loss:
Lˆ(fθ(x), y) = − log([fθ(x)]y) (8)
z˜
(0)
⊥ ∼ U(Z⊥)
z˜
(k)
⊥
[z‖, z˜
(k)
⊥ ]
x = dec(z‖, z⊥)
dec
fθ
∇
zˆ
(k)
⊥
Lˆ(fθ(·), y)projZ⊥
Figure 3. Illustration of the maximization process in Equation (9).
where [a]i returns the i-th coordinate of a, and gradient
ascent steps are then interleaved with projection steps for a
given number of iterations K. Formally, we find an estimate
z˜
(K)
⊥ of z˜
?
⊥ using the following recursion:
z˜
(k+1)
⊥ = projZ⊥
(
z˜
(k)
⊥ + α∇z˜(k)⊥ Lˆ(fθ(dec(z‖, z˜
(k)
⊥ )), y)
)
(9)
where z˜(0)⊥ is chosen at random within Z⊥, α is a constant
step-size and projA(a) is a projection operator that project
a onto A. Figure 3 illustrates the process.
Ultimately, Adversarial Mixing with Disentangled Rep-
resentations (shortened as AdvMix) tries to find parameters
that minimize the worst-case loss that could arise from alter-
ing the input examples through plausible transformations. It
guarantees that transformations of the input are meaningful
by using a disentangled latent representation that encodes in-
dependent controllable factors, where some of these factors
are known to be independent from the label. Finding such
a disentangled representation is rarely possible, as it is not
always known which variations of the input should or should
not affect the label. In some cases, however, it is possible
to train generative models such that we expect some subset
of the latents to not affect the label. Section 4 implements
AdvMix using a StyleGAN model.
Data with low density regions. The motivation behind
AdvMix stems from the manifold hypothesis [43]. It states
that high dimensional data present in the real-world, such
as images, often lies on a low-dimensional manifold. As a
consequence, there exists large regions in the input space
that are outside the support of the data distribution. Hence,
for maximal efficiency, data augmentation and adversar-
ial training should be done carefully to make sure that the
augmented data is still within the support of the original
data distribution. Data augmentation techniques presented
in Figure 2 clearly violate this condition, and despite their
success, we cannot expect that they perform well across all
datasets (in fact, mixup performs poorly on Colored-MNIST).
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Figure 4. Comparison of mixup and AdvMix on a toy example.
In this example, we are given 200 datapoints from an unknown
distribution. Each data point (x1, x2) is sampled according to x1 ∼
N (z⊥,
√
3) where z⊥ ∈ Z⊥ = {0., 10.} and x2 ∼ N (z‖, 1)
where z‖ ∈ Z‖ = {0., 20.}. The colors represent the label. Note
that the latent variable z‖ = 20y is dependent on the label while
z⊥ is independent of the label. Panel (a) shows the original set of
200 datapoints; panel (b) shows the effect of sampling additional
data using AdvMix; and panel (c) shows the effect of mixup. Of
course, we should point out that our method, AdvMix, is aware of
the underlying latent representation, while mixup is not.
Similarly, adversarial training targeting `p-norm bounded
perturbations tend to trade-off accuracy for robustness [23].
Figure 4 compares mixup and AdvMix on a toy example. In
this example, we artificially construct a dataset with two
classes and an underlying disentangled latent representation.
We observe that by exploiting the knowledge of the disentan-
gled latent representation, AdvMix is capable of generating
additional datapoints that are consistent with the original
dataset, while mixup generates additional datapoints that are
unlikely.
Relationship to mixup. mixup augments data with respect
to the input space. Given two pairs of inputs (xA, yA),
(xB , yB) and a linear interpolation factor sampled from a
β-distribution λ ∼ β(α, α), mixup generate a new input pair
as follows:
x˜ = λxA + (1− λ)xB
y˜ = λyA + (1− λ)yB . (10)
Our methodology combines inputs (xA, yA) and (xB , yB)
in the latent space. If xA = dec(zA‖, zA⊥) and xB =
dec(zB‖, zB⊥), we obtain
x˜ = dec(zA‖, zB⊥)
y˜ = yA. (11)
Crucially, this combination only affects the latent sub-space
that is independent from the label, thus the label remains
unchanged. We also note that no interpolation occurs in the
latent space (i.e., λzA⊥ + (1− λ)zB⊥) as this could result
in points that are outside Z⊥ when Z⊥ is not convex.
Relationship to Invariant Risk Minimization. Arjovsky
et al. [25] consider the case where we have multiple datasets
De = {xi, yi}ni=1 drawn from different training environ-
ments e ∈ E . As explained in [25], the motivation behind
IRM is to minimize the worst-case risk
max
e∈E
E
(x,y)∈De
[L(fθ(x), y)] . (12)
In this paper, the environments are defined by the different in-
stances of z⊥ ∈ Z⊥. Given a dataset {dec(zi‖, zi⊥), yi}ni=1,
we can rewrite the semantic adversarial risk shown in Equa-
tion (1) as Equation (12) by setting the environment set E
to
E = {{dec(zi‖, z⊥), yi}ni=1|z⊥ ∈ Z⊥}. (13)
This effectively create an ensemble of datasets for all possi-
ble combinations of z⊥ ∈ Z⊥ for all examples.
The crucial difference between IRM and AdvMix is in
the formulation of the risk. While IRM computes the risk
by enumerating over a countable set of environments and
picking the worst-case, AdvMix attempts to compute the
worst-case risk by finding the combination of variations that
maximize the risk over all examples.
4. Implementation using StyleGAN
So far, we have assumed the presence of a generator (or
decoder) that is capable of using a perfectly disentangled
latent representation. Furthermore, we have assumed that
this representation is partitioned into two subsets, one of
which is known to be independent from the target label.
In practice, the methodology is often reversed: generative
models are trained in the hope of obtaining some level of
disentanglement. If a partition of the trained latent space
does not influence the label, we can use the corresponding
trained generator within AdvMix. This section explains why
StyleGAN is a good candidate and details how to implement
AdvMix in this context.
StyleGAN. StyleGAN is a generator architecture for gener-
ative adversarial networks proposed by Karras et al. [24]. It
borrows interesting properties from the style transfer litera-
ture [44]. In this work, we rely on the style mixing property.
Formally, the StyleGAN architecture is composed of two
stages. The first stage takes a latent variable z ∼ N (0,1)
that is not necessarily disentangled and projects it into a
disentangled latent space z = map(z). The second stage
synthesizes an image x from the disentangled latents z using
a decoder x = dec(z). Overall, the process of generating an
image x using a StyleGAN network is defined as
x = dec ◦ map(z) where z ∼ N (0,1). (14)
The intermediate latent variables z provide some level of
disentanglement that affects image generation at different
spatial resolutions which allows us to control the synthesis
of an image. Particularly, we can apply the “style” of an
image to another by mixing the disentangled latents of these
images together. In the context of face generation, the styles
corresponding to coarse spatial resolutions affect high-level
aspects such as pose, and styles of fine resolutions affect
mainly the color scheme. In the rest of this manuscript, we fo-
cus on variations of the finer style.2 Concretely, we make the
assumption that the coarse attributes may be label-dependent,
z‖, while the fine attributes are label-independent, z⊥. Con-
sequently, the finer style zB⊥ of an image xB can be applied
to another image xA = dec(zA‖, zA⊥) via dec(zA‖ , zB⊥).
Figure 5b shows a nominal image and two variations of that
image obtained by mixing the finer style of two other images.
Definition of the transformation set. For completeness,
we can now define the set of transforms T in Equation (5)
by defining Z⊥. While the formulation of StyleGAN allows
z to be sampled within an infinite support, our formulation
requires Z⊥ to be finite. As explained by Nalisnick et al.
[45], due to concentration of measure, a generative model
usually draws samples from its typical set [46] (a subset of
the model’s full support) rather than regions of high proba-
bility density.3 As such, if z ∈ Rd, we wish4 to define Z⊥
as follows:
Z⊥ =
{
map(z)⊥
∣∣∣∣√d− δd 14 ≤ ‖z‖2 ≤ √d+ δd 14}
(15)
where δ is a small tunable positive constant.
Construction of a dataset of disentangled latents. In or-
der to extract the coarse style, z‖, from a dataset, D =
{xi, yi}ni=1, we need to find a mapping between the im-
age space and the latent space. This mapping, which can
be computed offline, is used to construct the latent dataset
{zi, yi}ni=1, and is only required once for each new dataset.
Specifically, this mapping is denoted as enc : X 7→ Z and
finds zi such that xi ≈ dec(zi). Algorithm 1 defines this
mapping through an optimization process. Inspired by [48],
and rather than relying solely on the distance between pixel
values to define the loss of that optimization, we use the
perceptual loss [49, 50] – which helps steer the optimization
process. The perceptual loss is defined on the intermediate
activations of a trained VGG-16 network [51] (see line 7).
We also found that the StyleGAN generator, dec, is a surjec-
tive mapping between its disentangled latent space and the
2Other variations are possible as long as we have the certainty that they
should not affect the label of interest.
3For d-dimensional isotropic Gaussian with standard deviation σ, the
typical set resides at a distance of σ
√
d from the mode [47].
4In practice, for efficiency reason, we do not want to backpropagate
through the map operation and we instead form the typical set by sam-
pling a small number of disentangled latents (more details are given in
Algorithm 2).
(a) (b)
Figure 5. Panel a shows how the latents are progressively able to match a target image (on the far right). Panel b shows two different
variations of the obtained image.
Algorithm 1 Encoder enc
Input: Target image x, trained StyleGAN model dec ◦ map, and trained
VGG network vgg. αi and βi are hyperparameters all set to 1 and 1/5
respectively. γ(k) is a step-size schedule.
Output: Disentangled latents zˆ such that dec(zˆ) ≈ x
1: zˆ ← 1
M
∑M
i=1 map(z
(i)) with z(i) ∼ N (0,1) . Average latents
2: for k ∈ {1, . . . , N} do . N is the number of iterations
3: xˆ = dec(zˆ)
4: Aˆ = vgg(xˆ) . Aˆ is a list of activations (after the 2nd con-
volution of 1st, 2nd and 3rd blocks)
5: A = vgg(x)
6: Amix = vgg(dec(zˆ‖, map(z)⊥))) with z ∼ N (0,1)
7: Lreconstruct = α0‖xˆ− x‖22 +
∑|A|
i=1 αi‖Aˆi −Ai‖22
. Reconstruction loss
8: Lmix =
∑|A|
i=1 βi‖Amix,i −Ai‖22 . Mixing loss
9: zˆ ← zˆ − γ(k)∇zˆ (Lreconstruct + Lmix)
10: end for
image space (i.e., multiple latents can decode into the same
image). Hence, since we heavily rely on the mixing property
of StyleGAN, and to the contrary of [48], we propose to add
an additional component to the loss that steers the latents
towards a subset of latents that can be mixed. In particular,
we add a perceptual loss between the synthesized image and
a mixed version of the same image, mixed with a randomly
generated image (see lines 6 and 8). Figure 5 shows the evo-
lution of the optimization process as well as mixed variants
of the same image.
Generating worst-case examples to train robust models.
As explained in Section 3, minimizing the semantic adver-
sarial risk requires solving an inner-maximization problem
for which we use projected gradient ascent. Algorithm 2
illustrates the process. It approximates the typical set in
Equation (15) by randomly sampling initial latents z˜(0)⊥ Nr
times and projecting intermediate solutions z˜(k)⊥ back onto
a neighborhood of z˜(0)⊥ .
5 It refines the initial latents using
gradient ascent on the cross-entropy loss with the goal of
finding latents z˜(K)⊥ that, when mixed with the original image
latents z‖, generate an image dec(z‖, z˜
(K)
⊥ ) that is misclassi-
fied. Figure 1 shows the result of this optimization procedure
where the original image is classified as “not smiling” and
5The actual implementation used in the experimental section projects
back onto a `∞-bounded neighborhood around z˜
(0)
⊥ : {z⊥|‖z˜
(0)
⊥ −
z⊥‖∞ < } where  is set to 0.03.
Algorithm 2 Solution to Equation (7)
Input: A nominal input x and label y, a model fθ , a StyleGAN model
dec ◦ map and an encoder enc. L is the 0 − 1 loss and Lˆ is the
cross-entropy loss.
Output: Possible misclassified example x˜
1: x˜← x
2: [z‖, z⊥] = enc(x) . See Algorithm 1
3: for r ∈ {1, . . . , Nr} do . Repeat Nr times
4: z˜(0)⊥ ← map(z)⊥ with z ∼ N (0,1) . Initial latents
5: x˜(0) = dec(z‖, z˜
(0)
⊥ )
6: for k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} do . K is the number of optimization steps
7: z˜(k)⊥ ← proj
(
z˜
(k−1)
⊥ + α∇z˜(k−1)⊥ Lˆ(fθ(x˜
(0)), y)
)
8: x˜(k) = dec(z‖, z˜
(k)
⊥ )
9: if L(fθ(x˜(k)), y) > L(fθ(x˜, y) then
10: x˜← x˜(k)
11: return . Since L is the 0 − 1 loss, the procedure
can terminate early
12: end if
13: end for
14: end for
the optimized image is classified as “smiling”. From hereon,
the training process is identical to adversarial training as
proposed in [19]. For each training batch, and each example
in that batch, we find a potential variation that would be
misclassified and minimize the cross-entropy loss at these
variations.
Random mixing with disentangled representations.
While this section describes an instantiation of AdvMix using
StyleGAN, it is possible to formulate an equivalent random
data augmentation baseline. For an input x, we generate a
random variation as follows:
x˜ = dec(enc(x)‖, map(z)⊥) with z ∼ N (0,1) (16)
5. Results
In this section, we compare AdvMix to (i) nominal train-
ing which minimizes the empirical risk, (ii) Adversarial
Training (AT) which minimizes the adversarial risk over `∞-
norm bounded perturbations of size  in input space [19],
and (iii) Random Mixing with Disentangled Representations
(RandMix) which minimizes the vicinal risk by randomly
sampling latents from Z⊥ (rather than systematically finding
the worst-case variations). We perform two experiments to
Figure 6. Mean colors given to each digit in the training set of our
Colored-MNIST case-study.
assess the generalization abilities of AdvMix. The first ex-
periment is done on an artificially constructed dataset called
Colored-MNIST (it bares resemblance to the Colored-MNIST
experiments present in [25]). The second experiment uses
CELEBA. Both experiment demonstrate that methods us-
ing semantic variations as expressed by a trained StyleGAN
model achieve higher accuracy. It also demonstrates that,
when the distribution of variations is skewed (i.e., some vari-
ations z⊥ appear more often than others in the dataset used to
train the StyleGAN model), AdvMix obtains higher accuracy
than RandMix. For both experiments, we use a truncated
VGG network with 5 layers. We use the Adam [52] opti-
mizer with a learning rate of 10−3. AdvMix is trained with
Nr set to 5.
5.1. Colored-MNIST
Colored-MNIST consists of a dataset of MNIST [53] dig-
its that are artificially colored to emphasize bias. On the
training set, we color each pair (x, y) of the original MNIST
dataset with a color drawn randomly from a normal distribu-
tion with mean µy and standard deviation σ (means µy for
y ∈ {0, . . . , 9} are shown in Figure 6). On the test set, we
randomly color digits. In other words, the colors present in
the training set spuriously correlate with the label. We can
use σ to affect this correlation: by progressively increasing
σ the dataset becomes less biased. For all techniques (includ-
ing mixup), we vary the level of bias and train models using
5 epochs. The StyleGAN model is trained on the training set
only, once for each setting of σ. The disentangled latents
defining the finer style correspond to the final resolution of
32× 32.6
Figure 7 shows the results. Across all settings, RandMix
and AdvMix outperform the other methods. As expected,
the gap between all methods decreases as the training set
becomes less biased. It is also worth noting that AT is useful
(compared to nominal training and mixup) as on this dataset
`∞-norm bounded perturbations allow the exploration of
slight variations in colors. RandMix and AdvMix are both
expected to do well as all variations z⊥ (that correspond
to applications of different colors) are equally likely to be
drawn from the StyleGAN model (since they are uniformly
distributed in the training set).
To further emphasize the difference between RandMix
and AdvMix, we purposefully bias the training of the Style-
GAN model. We create two additional datasets (with σ = 0).
632 corresponds to the next power of two after 28 which is the size of
the original MNIST dataset.
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Figure 7. Accuracy of different training methods on images from
our unbiased Colored-MNIST test set. The training set is progres-
sively debiased by increasing the standard deviation of the colors
present.
With the first dataset (named “more biased”), the StyleGAN
model is trained on a large fraction of zeros (and few other
digits), while on the second dataset (named “less biased”,
the StyleGAN model is trained on a large fraction of zeros
and ones. As a result, rarely occurring variations (colors of
digits from 1 to 9 for the first dataset and colors of digits
from 2 to 9 for the second) are less likely to be randomly
selected by RandMix. Table 1 shows the results. We observe
that AdvMix performs better. However, we note that the gap
is not large, as all color variations all contain red, green and
blue components (which allows the network to implicitly
learn about other color combinations).
Finally, to create a stronger effect, we limit digits to the
red, green and blue colors only (resulting in new datasets),
and use a linear classifier. Table 2 demonstrates that, when
the StyleGAN model is trained with a significant proportion
of red digits, AdvMix does much better. Indeed, AdvMix
is able to systematically find the corner cases (i.e., green
and blue variations) that are currently misclassified rather
than relying on the random sampling of such cases. We
note that adversarial training can result in unstable learning,
which can explain why RandMix does slightly better when
the StyleGAN model is unbiased.
Table 1. Effect of bias when training a StyleGAN model on our
Colored-MNIST dataset.
Test accuracy on clean images
Method Unbiased Less biased More biased
RandMix 99.11% 98.87% 97.63%
AdvMix 99.19% 99.07% 98.79%
Table 2. Effect of bias when training a StyleGAN model on our
RGB Colored-MNIST dataset (limited to red, blue or green colors).
The classifier is a linear model (instead of a convolutional network).
Test accuracy on clean images
Unbiased 99% red 99.9% red
Method Less biased More biased
RandMix 88.55% 83.18% 53.56%
AdvMix 85.07% 85.02% 85.00%
Figure 8. The top row shows examples of clean images from
CELEBA that are all classified correctly by the nominal model.
The bottom row shows semantically plausible variants of these
images that are all misclassified.
5.2. CELEBA
CELEBA [54] is a large-scale public dataset with forty
different face attribute annotations including whether a per-
son smiles or wears a hat. We make no modifications to
the dataset and use a pretrained StyleGAN model 7. For all
techniques, we train models using 20 epochs. We evaluate
all methods on their ability to classify the “smiling” attribute,
as well as three other attributes.8 In this experiment, the
disentangled latents defining the finer style correspond to
resolutions ranging from 128 × 128 to 1024 × 1024.9 In
addition, to the evaluation of the unmodified clean test set,
we also evaluate all methods by executing Algorithm 2 with
Nr set to 10. In other words, for each trained classifier, we
try to find a misclassified variant for each example of the test
set. When a misclassified variant is found, we count the cor-
responding example as misclassified “under perturbation”.
We observe that AdvMix is the only method that systemat-
ically achieves high accuracy on clean and perturbed images.
It is also interesting to see that RandMix does not always im-
prove on nominal training and that AT consistently trades off
clean accuracy for `∞-robustness (as seen in [23]). Finally,
Figure 8 shows qualitative examples of images that are all
correctly classified by the nominal model, but for which we
can find plausible variants that are misclassified.
7https://github.com/NVlabs/stylegan
8Due to their sensitive connotation, we purposefully anonymized the
other attribute names and picked them from easier to harder classification
tasks.
9We always re-scale the resulting images to a 64× 64 resolution.
Table 3. Clean accuracy and accuracy under perturbations on differ-
ent classification tasks of the CELEBA dataset.
Accuracy on Attribute 1
Method Clean Under perturbation
Nominal 96.49% 40.35%
RandMix 96.70% 39.41%
AT `∞ with  = 4/255 95.34% 48.91%
AT `∞ with  = 8/255 95.22% 45.01%
AdvMix 97.56% 84.29%
Accuracy on Attribute 2 (smiling)
Nominal 90.22% 18.60%
RandMix 90.36% 23.51%
AT `∞ with  = 4/255 91.11% 60.93%
AT `∞ with  = 8/255 89.29% 56.19%
AdvMix 92.29% 74.55%
Accuracy on Attribute 3
Nominal 83.52% 3.31%
RandMix 84.49% 3.19%
AT `∞ with  = 4/255 81.43% 52.92%
AT `∞ with  = 8/255 79.46% 62.71%
AdvMix 85.44% 69.55%
Accuracy on Attribute 4
Nominal 78.05% 0.23%
RandMix 76.41% 0.42%
AT `∞ with  = 4/255 76.61% 9.74%
AT `∞ with  = 8/255 74.39% 5.68%
AdvMix 79.47% 47.95%
6. Conclusion
We have demonstrated a novel approach to achieving ro-
bustness to input variations encountered in the real world
by generating adversarial instances that compose disentan-
gled representations. We have shown how this framework
can be realized by leveraging the StyleGAN architecture –
resulting in models that are not only robust to systematic
evaluation of insensitivity to variations but also exhibit bet-
ter generalization, demonstrating that that accuracy is not
necessarily at odds with robustness. Our formulation relies
on good generative models that can learn a disentangled rep-
resentation from which some directions are orthogonal to
the label we are trying to predict. Methods such as AdvMix
are intended to be used to reduce the effect of bias and spu-
rious correlations on classifiers.10 We hope the promising
results shown in this paper encourage the development of
more effective disentangled representations that cover most
factors of variations encountered in the real world. Finally,
we hope this work leads to the exploration of this paradigm
in the context of other Computer Vision applications and
leads to the development of robust perception systems that
can be safely used in the real world.
10It may be possible to use AdvMix to increase classification bias. How-
ever, other approaches are likely more effective to achieve this.
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Achieving Robustness in the Wild via
Adversarial Mixing with Disentangled Representations
(Supplementary Material)
A. Additional examples
Figure 9 shows additional examples of perturbations obtained on Colored-MNIST by (a) mixup, (b) adversarial attacks
on `∞-bounded perturbations of size  = 0.1, and (c) our method AdvMix. Figure 10 shows examples on CELEBA. The
underlying classifier is the nominally trained convolutional network. We observe that the perturbations generated by AdvMix
are semantically meaningful and result in plausible image variants – to the contrary of the other two methods.
(a) mixup
(b) Adversarial Training ( = 0.1)
(c) AdvMix or RandMix
Figure 9. Example of perturbations obtained by different techniques on our Colored-MNIST dataset. The image on the far left is the original
image. On the same row are variations of that image. Even rows show the rescaled difference between the original image and its variants.
(a) mixup
(b) Adversarial Training ( = 8/255)
(c) AdvMix or RandMix
Figure 10. Example of perturbations obtained by different techniques on CELEBA. The image on the far left is the original image. On the
same row are variations of that image. Even rows show the rescaled difference between the original image and its variants.
Figure 11 shows image variants generated by AdvMix. For four out of five images, AdvMix is able to change the decision of
a “smile” detector (nominally trained on CELEBA). We can qualitatively observe that brighter skin-tone and rosy cheeks tends
to produce images that are more easily classified as “smiling”. Our interpretation is that pictures on the second row appear to
be taken using flash photography (where it is more common for people to smile). The second picture from the left (on the
second row) also seem to be taken at night during an event.
Figure 11. Example of perturbations obtained by AdvMix on randomly generated images. The top row consists of images generated by
a StyleGAN model – all these images are classified as “not smiling” by the nominal classifier (the numbers indicate the classifier output
probability for “smiling”). The second row consists of adversarial perturbations obtained by AdvMix. The last row shows the rescaled
differences between the original images and their variant.
B. mixup results on CELEBA
For completeness, Table 4 shows the performance of mixup on the CELEBA attributes used in Table 3. We observe that
mixup sometimes improves over nominal training, but is otherwise consistently worse than AdvMix.
Table 4. Clean accuracy and accuracy under perturbations of mixup on different classification tasks of the CELEBA dataset.
Accuracy on Attribute 1
Method Clean Under perturbation
mixup (α = 0.2) 97.22% 50.48%
Accuracy on Attribute 2 (smiling)
mixup (α = 0.2) 90.95% 30.49%
Accuracy on Attribute 3
mixup (α = 0.2) 85.16% 3.51%
Accuracy on Attribute 4
mixup (α = 0.2) 76.80% 0.03%
